Do Buddhas “see” what we see?

One of the definitions of conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya) — that domain of truth that ordinary sentient beings like you and I occupy — that Candrakīrti gives is that it conceals the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya) of things — that domain of truth that is the exclusive purview of awakened or enlightened beings: “Because delusion obscures the true nature, it is a concealer; that which is contrived by it and appears to be real the Buddha spoke of as true for a concealer; and fabricated entities are merely conventional.” (MAV 6.28).

So although we can adjudicate between erroneous and non-erroneous conventional truths with respect to its domain (on the basis of improper/impaired v.s. proper/unimpaired uses of reason and cognition, respectively), with respect to the domain of ultimate truth all conventional truths are false (6.23-25). So although conventional truths are all relative, there are still relative degrees of truth within conventional truth and we can say that this preserves the meaningfulness of the values of goodness, truth, beauty and justice against the problems of evil, falsehood, ugliness and injustice; it’s just that these values do not have an ultimate, mind-independent reality that inherently exists.

But what is it that is actually doing the concealing? Is the concealing happening because the cognizing subject who apprehends a conventional phenomenon (whether the phenomenon is an entity, percept or concept) is projecting an image of something that’s not actually there, or is it happening because the cognized object itself covers over what is actually occuring?

Perhaps you can say that the two are mutually implicated: the manner in which a cognized object appears to a cognizing subject is appropriate to the manner in which the cognizing subject apprehends the cognized object, so the two are mutually entangled and can be said to fulfill distinct but complementary functions in the overarching process of cognitive concealment. This is consistent with the principle of dependent origination where pairs of opposing concepts or functions are understood to be reciprocally determining (idaṃpratyayatā).

If the two are mutually implicated like this, then it would seem as though conventional truths are entirely of the purview of cognitive actors under the spell of delusion which conceals the true nature. So now we can ask: if this is the case, do Buddhas “see” conventional truths?

If Buddhas do see conventional truths, then how do we stay consistent with both the understanding that Buddhas are not bound to the conventions of the world and the understanding that conventionally cognized objects only appear to cognitive subjects appropriate to them? Buddhas are supposed to be free of the “impure vision” plaguing cognitive subjects entangled with a world of conventionally cognized objects.

If Buddhas do not see conventional truths, then how do we account for the relational activity by which Buddhas come to teach worldly beings in terms that they can understand? It is in the very nature of Buddhas to teach sentient beings the way to awaken.

Explaining Bodhisattvas — the “transitionary” stage between ordinary sentient beings and fully awakened Buddhas — seems easier to me: they oscillate to varying degrees moment-by-moment between seeing like a sentient being and seeing like an awakened being, depending on the residual karmic momentum they are still affected and conditioned by. But Bodhisattvas can continue to progress on the path and do their job of liberating beings because they are not affected by their seeing things conventionally in the way sentient beings are affected (i.e. by the three poisons), and thus do not produce any new karma that would make them regress on the path. I think this is supported by Śāntideva BCA 9.8. where he says that phenomena are “relative for yogis, but for worldly beings, ultimate”.

So understanding that Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas (all Buddhas were previously Bodhisattvas on the bhumis), this gives us ways of making sense of Buddhas’ relationship to conventional truth, but these are two equally applicable but mutually exclusive ways of making sense of this:

In one way, we can say that Buddhas are like Bodhisattvas in that they can still see conventional truths but are not affected by them, but unlike a Bodhisattva they also see ultimate truths at the same time. This is pretty much the Gelug understanding of Buddha’s gnosis.

In another way, we can say that Buddhas are like Bodhisattvas in that they have a kind of embodied memory that always allows them to operate virtuously and effectively even when being enmeshed in the conventional world, but unlike Bodhisattvas they don’t need to actually cognize things in order to function intentionally. This would be a lot like non-Gelug approaches to Buddhas’ gnosis, particularly the Sakya.

The issue with the former, Gelug-style view is that it asks us to affirm both conventional and ultimate truths even though for the most part we affirm the ultimate over the conventional; this seems to undermine the value of the ultimate. The issue with the latter, non-Gelug view is that it begs the question as to how Buddhas can act in a world they not only do not but cannot see; this seems to undermine the value of the conventional.

Each perspective is interesting on its own but as we see, each are inconsistent on their own.

But we can’t try to have both perspectives at the same time because they are clearly mutually exclusive: one perspective says Buddhas see what we see and the other says Buddhas do not see what we see. We can’t affirm two contradictory statements at the same time because that is irrational. But if both perspectives are equally as true as they are false, then does it matter if we say “both”?

Nor can we just say neither and dismiss the problematic entirely by saying “Buddha’s gnosis is ineffable and inexpressible” because having a systematic understanding of the Buddha’s dharma and all that it entails is, at the very least provisionally and expediently, useful for progress on the path. Still, the emphasis on ineffability and inexpressibility does say something very important: that when considering What Is It Like to Be A Buddha, we are coming up against the very limits of thought itself where thought unravels its own ability to ground itself. Perhaps that itself is a teaching: to know what it is like to be Buddha we cannot think it but must live it.