Late modern scholars of Madhyamaka Buddhism have called Nagarjuna’s dialectical negation of conceptual opposites (and other widely deployed Madhyamaka techniques such as the neither-one-nor-many argument) a “bi-negation” which negates both a thesis and its negation (and by implication, any possible combination of the two).
Critically, the Madhyamaka bi-negation is distinguished from the fourth limb of the “tetralemma” of “extreme” (ultimately untenable) positions based in either: affirming an identity (first limb), denying it (second limb), both affirming and denying (third limb), or neither affirming nor denying (fourth limb). The Madhyamaka dialectic negates all four extremes, so it would be inconsistent to suggest that the Madhyamaka approach is actually one of the extremes that it negates.
The fourth limb (neither affirming nor denying existence) is an ostensible position or view based in the ignorance of dependent origination. With regard to causation, the fourth limb amounts to the view that effects are neither identical to their cause nor different from them, which is to say that effects arise spontaneously without cause. But effects do not arise spontaneously, because as per the rule of dependent origination, effects depend upon antecedent conditions for their arising. Hence the fourth limb of the tetralemma is negated by Madhyamaka analysis.
The Madhyamaka use of bi-negation is distinguished from the fourth limb of the tetralemma principally by the fact that Madhyamaka bi-negation is not used for the purpose of establishing a view but precisely the opposite: to undermine views. The Madhyamaka bi-negation of conceptual opposites leads us away from the tetralemma of extreme positions. Yet Madhyamikas like Nagarjuna also affirm a kind of “positive tetralemma” in MMK 18:8: “All is real, or all is unreal, all is both real and unreal, all is neither unreal nor real; this is the graded teaching of the Buddha.” This suggests that the bi-negation of conceptual opposites also entails their relative resuscitation on a provisional, expedient basis (rather than the impossible basis of inherent existence).
Some Buddhist critics consider Process philosophy to occupy the third limb of the tetralemma, the extreme position of “both affirming and denying”, and hence Process philosophy would count as a view to negate. Even some Process philosophers think this would be the case, and cite this as a reason for the incompatibility between Buddhism and Process. Some evidence of this is the Whiteheadian notion that the concrescence of an actual occasion is both a cumulative advance (whereby the present creative becoming adds to its prehended past) and a perpetual perishing (whereby the satisfaction of a creative becoming immediately becomes datum for future prehensions).
But considering that the Madhyamaka bi-negation implies the positive tetralemma as mentioned above, then could we not consider Process philosophy to actually (or at least potentially) satisfy the third limb of the positive tetralemma (“Both real and not real”) that is resuscitated on a provisional, expedient basis rather than the negative tetralemma based on the assumption of inherent existence that is negated by Madhyamaka analysis? This would point towards the compatibility and complementarity of Buddhism and Process, rather than their incompatibility and competition.
The key, however, is how exactly is the Process side of things expressed. If is guided by the motivation to establish some form of inherent existence, some ultimate and final view of reality once and for all based on some bedrock foundations, then it veers towards being an expression of the third limb of the negative tetralemma, the extreme view that reality “both exists and does not exist” in an inherent way. This sort of expression of Process thought will fall under the scope of Madhyamaka negation. Then again, such a view would not really be a Process view, at least not consistently. A truly consistent Process approach would count as an expression of the third limb of the positive tetralemma, the relative view that reality “both exists and does not exist” that serves a principally practical function, rendering that relative view a self-consciously provisional and expedient framework; a set of tools with which to change reality, rather than simply interpret it.
For me, some key features of Whiteheadian process thought are quiet risky, as they can make the difference between the Process approach being a view expressed as third limb of the negative tetralemma or a perspective expressing the third limb of the positive tetralemma. These are: the status of “eternal objects,” the “primordial nature” of Whitehead’s God and the monotheism of this God — all of which are interrelated in Whitehead’s system. Preserving the function each of these elements play in the overall coherence of the Process system while deflating their ontological significance and/or modifying their form is one of the major tasks of any Process Buddhist synthesis.
Holopoiesis 