The fundamental issue of Eliminative Materialism — the metaphysical view that subjective mental states do not actually exist — is that it cannot eliminate subjectivity from explanations of how consciousness works without also undermining the very thing that makes this elimination epistemically intelligible. If there is no agent of knowledge, how is this very knowledge itself of the absence of agency possible? The very possibility of such deflationary knowledge is at the same time assumed and denied.
This makes Eliminative Materialism basically incoherent as a complete metaphysical view (i.e. it is open/empty), but we can still retain it provisionally as an expedient framework that narrows attention to certain things (structural analysis of the formal properties and relations of the body-brain nexus) at the expense of other considerations (such as intentional states and qualia), all the while recognizing it is never anything but an abstract, static and partial perspective on a more concrete, dynamic and holistic reality that includes and transcends it.
A similar issue can be found in Panpsychism— the metaphysical view that all physical entities, not just humans and animals, also have an element of subjectivity — where the continuity of mentality is affirmed at the same time it is denied through discretization. The starting point of Panpsychism is often that mind cannot rise from physical factors which are themselves devoid of mentality because otherwise we would run into explanatory gaps. On that basis, it is affirmed that the only way to explain the existence of mentality is to consider all physical factors to have some degree of mentality, which closes the explanatory gap. But this inflationary move abandons the very distinction its line of reasoning depended upon, namely the distinction between the mental and the physical, by turning the mental into a property of the physical.
Whereas we can charge Eliminative Materialism with incoherence, we can charge Panpsychism with inconsistency. Both are open/empty views which are abstract and partial on their own because their search for completeness dooms them to internal contradictions. Just as some form of Eliminative Materialism can be resuscitated on a provisional level as an expedient way to focus on structural-physical aspects of the body-brain nexus, then so too can Panpsychism be resuscitated on a provisional level as an expedient way to focus on the qualitative-mental aspects of first-person experience. Neither can be considered to be a complete and total perspective on the nature of reality, and therefore also cannot function as a reliable basis for an overarching worldview or grand narrative capable of delivering universal salvation — only a higher-order perspective that inclusively transcends them while being reflexively aware of its own open/empty nature can function as such.
I am designing Process Buddhism to be precisely this sort of higher-order, inclusively-transcendent and reflexively open/empty perspective.
Holopoiesis 